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Preface 
Economic instruments are considered a potentially powerful means for in-
creasing the cost-effectiveness of strategies to improve the environment. 
Mechanisms such as joint implementation, trading of emission reduction 
obligations, emission charges, and taxes are currently the subject of much 
discussion. Often it is argued that such instruments could achieve substan-
tial cost savings over alternative regulatory approaches. 
IIASA's research on transboundary air pollution focuses inter alia on the 
question of whether such potential cost savings are achieved at the expense of 
environmental protection. The environmental impacts of "global" pollutants 
with a long atmospheric residence time, such as many greenhouse gases, 
are primarily determined by the total amount of emissions. However, for 
"regional" pollutants such as sulfur dioxide, which have a shorter life time, 
the location of the emissions may have a strong impact on the environmental 
effects. 
In order to overcome such problems, it has been suggested that an "ex-
change rate" be introduced to determine compensatory reductions necessary 
to ensure that the regional impacts from sulfur deposition remain unchanged. 
This paper analyzes whether a trading scheme for S02 emissions with an 
"exchange rate" could indeed account for the regional differences in environ-
mental sensitivities. 
Although the paper has its main emphasis on the economics of air pollu-
tion control, extensive use of other elements of IIASA 's integrated assessment 
work, e.g., models on atmospheric dispersion characteristics or the assess-
ment of regional environmental sensitivities, has been made. 
lll 
Peter E. de Janosi 
Director 
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Abstract. This paper explores the analytical and empirical properties of a new method for 
emission trading according to a fixed exchange rate. The exchange rate is based on the ratios 
of the marginal costs of abatement in the optimal solution in order to account for the impact 
of the location of emission sources on the deposition. It is shown that, generally, this system 
will not achieve the optimal solution and does not guarantee that environmental deposition 
constraints are not violated, although total abatement costs are always reduced. A routine was 
developed to mimic trading as a bilateral, sequential process, subject to an exchange rate. In 
the example used, results for S02 emissions in Europe show that, starting from a uniform 
reduction, exchange-rate trading achieves higher cost savings than one-to-one trading, without 
achieving the cost minimum. Sulfur deposition targets are not violated since the initial emission 
allocation overfulfilled targets at many places. The results are sensitive to: pre-trade emission 
levels, the transaction costs, the availability of information on potential cost savings and assump-
tions made on the behavior of trading partners. 
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1. Introduction 
Currently, negotiations are in progress on a new protocol to control sulfur 
dioxide emissions in Europe. The present protocol calls for all signatories to 
uniformly reduce their S02 emissions by 30% by 1993, in comparison to the 
year 1980. A major new element of the current negotiations is the intention 
to apply an effect-oriented approach by basing the extent of emission reduc-
tions on the susceptibility of natural ecosystems to acid deposition. This implies 
the setting of targets for the deposition. In Batterman and Amann ( 1991) and 
Derwent (1990) mathematical optimization procedures have been used to derive 
cost-minimal reduction patterns under the constraint of given deposition targets, 
assuming that full information on the atmospheric dispersion behavior of 
pollutants and emission reduction costs is available. So in principle, coun-
tries could base an agreement on the cost-minimal solution. Some countries, 
however, plead for more flexibility and for allowing countries to trade emission 
reduction commitments. Two reasons are important. Firstly, although countries 
might agree on implementing the cost-minimal solution, the uncertainty of cost 
estimates, as well as the fact that cost estimates change over time, can be 
put forward as arguments for allowing emission trading among countries. 
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Secondly, countries might not be able to agree on the cost-minimal solution. 
In this case, emission trading could be used to approach the optimal solution. 
A major concern in theory and practice has been the fact that sulfur dioxide 
deposition has different local effects and sulfur dioxide disperses non-
uniformly, implying that both emission level and location of sources influ-
ence the deposition pattern. Montgomery (1972) showed that there exists a 
set of prices on ambient permits issued for depositions at each receptor that 
yields the total cost minimum. Others raised questions on the practicality of 
these ambient permits, in view of the large number of markets in which 
polluters had to operate (Tietenberg, 1985) and all revisions of prices, due 
to differing patterns of emissions and depositions, as trade takes place. 
Moreover, countries would have to obtain permits for all downwind markets, 
and decide on whether to buy or sell if initial permits are issued for all regional 
markets. When permit prices change, permit demand/supply would have to 
be recalculated for each regional market. Alternatives, such as pollution-
offset trading, were suggested (McGartland and Oates, 1985; Krupnick et 
al., 1983) which in theory are equally cost-effective. Pollution offset trading 
allows one source to increase its emissions as long as another source reduces 
its emissions in such a way that deposition or concentration standards are 
not violated. The increase in concentration caused by one source has to be 
offset by a decrease by the other source. In such a regime, sources do not 
trade emissions on the basis of a fixed rate, but the rate (Krupnick et al., 
1983) depends on the actual emissions of all other sources and can be chosen 
by the trading sources. Simulation studies suggest, however, that if offset 
trading is simulated as a bilateral sequential process, trading might not attain 
the cost-minimum solution (Kruitwagen, 1992; Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1991). 
Practical application of emission trading, when subject to deposition rules 
(Borowski and Ellis, 1987), showed that, although cost savings are high, they 
are far from optimal (Hahn and Hester, 1989; Hahn, 1989; Tietenberg, 1990). 
Since dispersion models are required, this limits trading and cost savings 
considerably. This points to the need for simpler designs that still account 
for deposition goals. 
The objective of this paper is to explore the properties of a new, simple 
system of emission trading based on a fixed exchange rate. Under this system, 
sources are allowed to trade on the basis of exchange rates that account for 
the location of the sources. More specifically, the exchange rate between two 
sources depends on the (shadow price) weighted sum of the transfer coeffi-
cients of the binding receptors . The paper develops and applies a method to 
simulate exchange-rate trading as a bilateral, sequential process. 
The paper first examines the analytical properties of such an exchange-
rate trading. Secondly, the method and data to simulate a process of bilateral, 
sequential trading are described. Thirdly, some example results are given and 
discussed. 
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2. Cost-Effectiveness and Exchange-Rate Trading 
2.1. COST-EFFECTIVENESS WITH NON-UNIFORMLY DISPERSED POLLUTANTS 
When modelling the transfrontier pollution problem caused by airborne 
pollutants such as sulfur, two types of relationships have to be known: the 
efficient purification cost functions for each source, and the unit transport 
coefficient matrix, showing the amount of a unit of emission from one source 
reaching all receptors in question as depositions, for all sources in turn. 
A cost effective solution is achieved when desired levels of deposition at 
certain receptors are obtained at minimal total cost summing over source 
purification costs (Montgomery, 1972; Baumol and Oates, 1988): 1 
n 
Min L. c;(e9 - e;) 
i=l 
under the constraints (1) 
n 
L. aijei ~ Dj + bj, j = 1, ... , m 
i=l 
e; ~ e?, i = 1, ... , n 
e? = initial unrestricted emission; e; = remaining emission (after purifica-
tion), 0 ~ e; ~ e?; aij = transport from source i to receptor j per unit emitted 
from source i; bj = the exogenous background deposition at source j; 
Dj* = deposition target at receptor j. 
A necessary condition for an interior solution is: 
m 
c; - L. a;)°"j = 0, i = 1, .. . , n 
j=l 
(2) 
c; = marginal purification cost of source i; A.j = shadow price on the deposi-
tion target Dt (positive for binding receptors, zero otherwise) . 
The shadow prices relate to the changes in total purification costs of a marginal 
tightening of each deposition constraint in turn. 
To improve the understanding of the optimal solution the isocost curves 
(on implicit form) of the total purification cost function can be introduced: 
n 
L. c;(e? - e;) = constant. 
i=l 
(3) 
In the case of two sources, isocost curves can be introduced in a diagram 
depicting emissions from the two sources along the axes (Krupnick et al., 
1983). The isocost curve in Figure 1 shows the relationship between the two 
emissions for a constant level of total purification costs. The picture is based 
on the assumption that marginal abatement costs increase when emissions 
decrease. The picture is drawn in such a way that combinations of emissions 
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Emission source 2 
Restrictions R; 
D Emission source 1 
Fig. 1. The cost efficient solution. 
from both sources "north-east" of the depicted iso-cost curve imply lower costs, 
since emission levels are higher, and hence, emissions abated and associated 
costs are lower. Iso-cost curves located "south-west" from the one depicted 
result in higher costs, since emission levels are lower. Deposition constraints 
can be introduced in such a diagram as straight lines, since the unit trans-
portation coefficients are constants. Three receptors with the deposition 
restrictions R1, R2 and R3 are shown. These lines show combinations of 
emissions from both sources that lead to depositions equal to the standards. 
The slopes of the lines reflect the value of the transportation coefficients in 
question, and they show the offset rates between emissions from the two 
sources. 
The cost efficient solution is found at point E on the line segment BC. In 
this solution , it is only the deposition target for receptor 3 that is binding. 
The shadow prices A.1 and Ai are, accordingly, equal to zero. At the optimal 
point, E, the slope of the target load constraint that is binding, is equal to 
the slope of the total cost function. 
2.2. EXCHANGE-RATE TRADING 
As pointed out in the introduction, a system of issuing permits for each receptor 
is hardly operational. Another approach, more in line with the existing sulfur 
agreement, is to provide each country with a certain number of permits adding 
up to total allowed emissions per country. When emission permits are issued 
on a country basis, the resulting deposition pattern may not be the most cost-
effective way to meet a given set of deposition targets. In the current 
negotiations on a new sulfur protocol, national emission totals have been 
chosen so that an agreed set of targets for the deposition is met. Such targets 
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can be met at minimum cost or at higher costs, using another distribution of 
national emission reductions that might be politically more acceptable 
(UNECE, 1993). Introducing trading in permits between countries, for example 
on a one-to-one basis, does not restore the consideration of different regional 
deposition constraints. One idea then is to introduce fixed exchange rates 
for trades reflecting the different impact of emissions. The exchange rate gives 
the volume of emissions ont source has to decrease when another source 
increases its emissions with one unit. This concept differs from the concept 
of pollution-offset trading as described by Krupnick et al. (1983) in two 
respects: 
- In Krupnick et al. (1983) the offset rate is not fixed, but can be selected 
by the trading sources as long as the deposition constraints are not 
violated, whereas in our proposal, the exchange rate is fixed. 
- In our system there is no testing of violation of deposition constraints, 
but trades are allowed as long as the exchange rate is used. In Krupnick 
et al. (1983) only those trades are allowed that do not violate air quality 
standards. 
The relationship between marginal purification costs at source i and 
source s at the optimal solution is: 
(4) 
This ratio, v, will be called the "exchange rate" (or "trade ratio"). The 
marginal deposition costs in the optimum for each source differ according to 
variations in the transportation coefficients for the binding receptors. To explain 
how this exchange rate governs trading, one can imagine a simple example 
with one binding receptor (in the cost-minimum) and two sources. Assuming 
a transfer coefficient from source i to the receptor of 0.5 and from source s 
to the receptor of 1, the exchange rate would be 
~ = 0.5A.1 = 0.5 = 0 5 
c, 1A.1 1 . 
This implies that source i would have to reduce its emissions with two units 
if source s increases its emissions by one unit. It is obvious that in this case 
the deposition at the one binding receptor would not change. The arguments for 
taking the ratio of the marginal costs in the optimum as exchange rates are: 
- such an exchange rate takes into account the (weighted sum of) transfer 
coefficients that are binding in the optimum; 
- the ratio reflects one of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the cost-minimum 
solution. 
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Moreover, as for any fixed exchange rate, this has the advantage that 
trading is much simpler for the sources than trading with unknown trade ratios, 
where diffusion models have to be run after every single trade. This is expected 
to reduce transaction costs and stimulate trading and cost savings. 
A disadvantage of the system is that the cost-minimum solution needs to 
be known to set the exchange rates. In the current negotiations on a new 
sulfur protocol, such information is available and cost-minimum solutions 
are provided to policy-makers to assist them at arriving at their decision 
(cf. UNECE, 1993). It is also clear, however, that countries might rather 
agree for political reasons on a solution that, although meeting a set of 
deposition targets, will not be at minimum costs. One can then ask the 
question why a central planner cannot use this knowledge on costs to devise 
a cost-sharing mechanism to agree on the cost minimum. The answer is that 
although such cost-sharing agreements have been proposed in the recent 
past (Klaassen and Jansen, 1989; Bergman et al., 1992), none of these were 
accepted, whereas the system of exchange rates described in this paper is 
being seriously discussed in the current negotiations (UNECE, 1992) on a new 
sulfur protocol. 
First, an initial emission situation must be defined. Proportional reduc-
tions have been seen as the only fair solution in past agreements. If we take 
deposition targets seriously, an initial emission reduction can be defined as 
the least proportional reduction that does not violate the constraints. Referring 
to Figure 1, such a rule ensures that we start at a point on the feasible region 
ABCD. The situation is shown in Figure 2 by point F. 
An agreement on uniform proportional reduction moves us to point F on 
the feasible region. This is not cost effective, as can be seen by comparing 
Emission source 2 
Reslriclions RI 
A 
R 2 .- /n;t;s/ point 
~. _ "- -- -
Emission source 1 
Figure 2. Trade at a fixed exchange rate. 
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the isocost curve intersecting at F and the least cost curve tange~ to the feasible 
region at E. 
Opening up for emission trading from point F may improve the cost 
effectiveness. But, when considering bilateral trades, instead of trading on a 
one-to-one basis, the potential impact of the deposition patterns will be taken 
into consideration by imposing "trade prices" equal to the exchange rates 
defined in Eq. (4). Let us assume that countries find the new emission agree-
ment at F a burden and all try to lessen the costs by trading. Country 2 offers 
country I to decrease its emission by v units in order to increase its own 
emissions with one unit as long as the payment it has to offer is less than 
what it saves by purifying less. 
Expressing the solution (2) or the definition of the exchange rate (4) in 
the following way: 
c; = v · c; (5) 
where v is the ratio of marginal costs in the optimal solution, the following 
conditions for profitable trades emerge: 
(a) If c; > vc;, then country 1 profits by paying country 2 its marginal 
cost to purify more and to increase its own emissions. 
(b) If c~ < vc;, then country 2 profits by paying country 1 its marginal 
cost to purify more and to increase its own emissions. 
Using the optimal exchange rate, v, for all trades means that in Figure 2 
we are moving along a trade line through F with a slope equal in absolute value 
to the exchange rate. If country I is to increase its purification, we move 
into the interior of the feasible region, but clearly the optimal point E cannot 
be reached, since trading has to move along the dotted line (parallel to R3). 
This contrasts to Krupnick et al. ( 1983) where trades are allowed to take 
place as long as the constraints are not violated and the exchange rate is not 
fixed beforehand. 
At which point on the trade line will profitable trades be exhausted? 
Assuming the situation illustrated in Figure 2, we choose to see the situation 
from the point of view of the "high-cost" source 2 (without loss of gener-
ality). Assuming further that the "low-cost" source I offers to sell purification 
services to production costs at price v, the objective function for source 2 
will be to maximize the total cost difference between its own saving and 
what it has to pay source 1 for purification, subject to the trading rule of the 
exchange rate: 
s. t. the trading rule 
e~ - e~ = v(e~ - ef) 
(6) 
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e7 = emission after trade for country i, i = 1, 2; e; = negotiated protocol 
emission for country i , i = 1, 2. 
The condition for the marginal trade is found by differentiating (6), taking 
into consideration the trading rule by substituting e~ for e; in the lower 
integration limit in (6) . The rule (5) re-emerges, but it does not represent 
point E, due to the trading rule which now has to be satisfied. The point reached 
will be T, which, in Figure 2, is inside the feasible region. Since the trading 
line is parallel with the target load restriction R3 we have c; = vc; at T, and 
no more profitable trades are possible. The difference between the isocost 
curves through F and T shows the gains from trade. The reason the trade within 
the exchange rate regime does not realize the optimal solution is that the 
exchange rate should only apply in the optimum, while the trading rule imposes 
the optimal rate for all intramarginal trades. 
In general, the trade point T does not have to be inside the feasible region. 
The low cost source in our example reduces emissions, but the high cost source 
increases emissions, and may increase beyond the feasible region. This outcome 
is illustrated in Figure 3 by point T. Hence, if it is of paramount importance 
to keep the trade solution within the feasible region, it seems that trade must 
take place within an institutional framework, checking up on every trade for 
feasibility. If it is necessary to stay within the feasible region, restricting the 
traded volumes (while maintaining the fixed exchange rate) would be suffi-
cient to ensure that deposition targets are met. This would still prevent sources 
from attaining the cost minimum. The only way to solve this would be to return 
to the pollution offset trading a la Krupnick et al. ( 1983) which leaves 
determination of exchange rates to the sources as long as deposition targets 
are not violated. Whether violation of deposition targets has to be avoided at 
Emission source 2 
R3 
- - r· ' \ c \ 
·<'{ 
trade \ -
line ', 
--· un~:red~"":. _ F __ ~ __ • lnlt/11/po"" 
Emission source 1 
Fig. 3. Trade solution outside feasible region. 
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every single trade is basically a political trade-off. Recent changes in the 
USA suggest that fixed trade ratios, such as the one-to-one trading allowed 
since the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments for sulfur, might well be 
politically feasible (Kete, 1992). 
3. Method and Data 
3.1. THE MODEL APPLIED 
The method developed to simulate bilateral, sequential trading using trade 
ratios as introduced above makes use of an adapted version of the optimiza-
tion module in the RAINS (Regional Acidification INformation and 
Simulation) model (Alcamo et al., 1990) . The model has the theoretical 
structure of Eq. (1). 
The cost functions of emission reductions, corresponding to Eq. (1) , are 
expressed as piecewise linear curves denoting cost-minimal combinations of 
measures to achieve certain levels of national total emissions within each 
country (see Figure 4). The marginal costs are the slope of the total cost 
curve in each segment. r;,, is the purification in region i in segment s. The 
amount purified in each of the segments (s) is limited: 
0 :s; r;. s :s; rt1,ax, i = 1 , ... , 38, s = 1, ... , S. (7) 
The RAINS model simulates the flow of acidifying pollutants (sulfur and 
nitrogen) from source regions in Europe to environmental receptors . The 
current model (version 6.0) covers 38 source regions in Europe: 26 coun-
tries, 7 regions in the former USSR and 5 sea regions (ship emissions). 
Emissions can be controlled in 36 regions. Analysis of deposition is performed 
NnTIOHnL COST llllfCTION for SOZ - ltorway 
Tola I Cos ls 
Colo DIVyrl Year 2888 
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zee8 
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Fig. 4. Cost function. 
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for 547 land-based receptor sites with a regular grid size of 150 x 150 km. 
For this study we limited the attention to sulfur dioxide emissions and sulfur 
deposition in line with current negotiations. 
The optimization part of the RAINS model formulates possible strategies 
to minimize the costs of achieving deposition targets at certain receptors as 
a linear optimization problem (LP) that can be solved with LP packages 
(Amann, 1992; Batterman and Amann, 1991). The cost-effective solution 
requires that the total costs of emission reductions be minimized, subject to 
the constraint that the desired depositions are met at every receptor (see Eq. 
1). 
The piecewise linear cost function affects the practical definition of the 
exchange rate, which is the ratio of the marginal costs of the optimum. Due 
to the nature of linear optimization, the optimal status of most variables of 
an optimization problem will lie exactly at the corner points of the solution 
space, on the intersections of the linear cost function segments (e.g., point E 
in Figure 4). For these points, however, a unique definition of marginal costs 
does not exist (for point E, marginal costs are either 3900 or 5500 DM/ton 
S02). The marginal costs for increasing emissions differ from the marginal 
costs for decreasing emissions. For this reason the simulation uses the higher 
marginal costs (the additional costs of further reducing emissions represented 
by the next step of the cost curve) by default. This also avoids problems 
with marginal costs of zero, for which the definition of the exchange rate is 
not applicable. 
3.2. THE METHOD TO SIMULATE BILATERAL TRADING 
3.2.1. Introduction 
Until recently, many model studies simply assumed that the potential cost 
savings of emission trading would be identical to the results of optimization 
procedures; in other words, a perfectly working, competitive market where 
emission permits are simultaneously traded was assumed. Practice, as well 
as recent model studies (Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1991; Tietenberg, 1990), 
suggest that in reality trading takes place bilaterally and sequentially. With 
such restrictions, trading is not expected to capture the complete cost savings 
possible according to any LP cost minimisation procedure (compare Atkinson 
and Tietenberg, 1991 ). The trading algorithm presented here describes a process 
of repeated bilateral trading, subject to an offset or exchange rate for every 
possible combination of bilateral trades. 
Figure 5 depicts a flow diagram of the trading algorithm. The diagram shows 
that the procedure consists of the following steps: 
1. Creation of a matrix of potential cost savings from each potential 
bilateral trade. 
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matrix ol 
possible 
trades 
stop 
If empty 
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emissions 
traded 
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CJ Input 
Fig . 5. Flow diagram of bilateral trading. 
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2. Specification of transaction costs and determination of threshold level, 
below which trades will not take place. 
3. Selection of the trading sequence, taking the most profitable one first. 
4. Updating of emissions after implementation of the selected trade and 
recording cost savings. 
5. Updating of the matrix of possible trades , accounting for the trades 
that took place (return to step 1). 
Regarding the creation of the cost-saving matrix, one should realize that 
cost functions estimated with the RAINS model are piecewise linear. As a 
result, RAINS does not work by equalizing marginal costs, but sorts and 
ranks elements of two (or more) cost functions according to their marginal 
costs (in ascending order). If an exchange rate is introduced, the determina-
tion of the cost-optimal bilateral combination of emission reductions can be 
performed in a similar way. 
The two conditions for an optimum solution for each bilateral trade are 
condition (5) and the trade rule in (6), stating that the emission increase by 
source 2 should equal the emission decrease of source 2 multiplied by the 
exchange rate. Alternatively, the trade rule can be written as : 
(8) 
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Since emissions have different impacts on the receptors a simple summation 
of emissions has little meaning. In order to get the emissions on the same 
receptor-oriented unit of measurement, emissions from source two (arbitrary 
choice) are weighted with the exchange rate. On the left-hand side we have 
the emissions after trade, while on the right-hand side we have the negoti-
ated emissions, and on both sides the emissions are made comparable by 
weighting. We see clearly that it is only for the case of the exchange rate being 
1 that pre-trade emission levels equal post-trade in tons. 
Eqs. (5) and (8) have two unknowns, the post-trade emissions. For each pair 
of countries, n x (n - 1)/2 = 630, we can find the solutions and create a 
matrix of cost savings of all possible trades. 
In emission trading practice in the USA it can be observed that transac-
tions costs frequently prohibit trading. Transactions costs are estimated at 
10-30% of the costs savings (Dwyer, 1991 ). Building in transaction costs 
(Step 2 in Figure 5) thus gives a more realistic picture of the potential cost 
savings. The algorithm allows specification of a (exogenous) level of trans-
action costs for each trade. If cost savings of a potential bilateral trade are 
below the threshold, the trade is not profitable and skipped from further 
selection. 
After calculating the matrix of cost savings of all possible (and profitable) 
trades the sequence of trading is determined. Currently, the algorithm ranks 
all possible trades according to their cost savings and selects the one with 
the highest cost savings. Cost savings are defined as the difference between 
the total cost increase of the emission permit selling sources and the total 
cost decrease of the emission increasing source, between the pre-trade emission 
level (of every round) and the post-trade emission level. This is an optimistic 
assumption, assuming perfect information and coordination of the selection 
of traders. An alternative assumption, currently not implemented, would be 
that the selection of trade takes place at random. This is due to the imper-
fect information of traders and due to the competition between countries to 
get that trade accepted that is best for these two individual trade partners 
and not necessarily the best in terms of highest overall cost savings. When 
selecting the trade, the model does not explicitly check if the deposition targets 
are violated or not. 
Updating the emission matrix and the matrix of possible trades is the final 
step. 
Upon completion of the trade(s), the following steps are implemented: 
1. Update the (pre-trade) emission vector, accounting for the trade(s) that 
took place. 
2. Record the cost savings of the trade (compared to the pre-trade situa-
tion) in a file. 
Finally, the matrix of possible trades is updated. Sources that have already 
traded are allowed to trade again, but not with the same partner: the cells of 
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the cost-savings matrix corresponding to the trade between the two regions 
concluding the trade are skipped, and the cost savings of all the other trade 
relationships of these two countries are recalculated with the new emission 
levels. 
3.3. DATA ON COSTS AND ATMOSPHERIC TRANSPORT 
The RAINS model contains a sub-module to assess the feasibility and costs 
of alternative emission abatement technologies. The evaluation is based on 
internationally reported performance and cost data of control devices (Amann 
and Kornai, 1987). Cost estimates for specific technologies are extrapolated 
by the model to reflect country-specific conditions such as operating hours, 
boiler size, and fuel price. The following technical options are available: 
1. Use of low sulfur fuels and fuel desulfurisation. This pertains to the 
use of fuels with a reduced sulfur content, such as fuels with a lower 
natural sulfur content or fuels that have undergone a desulfurisation 
process. For low sulfur hard coal, the sulfur content is set at 1 %. 
Desulfurisation of gas oil and diesel oil can reduce the sulfur content 
in two steps: down to 0.3% and down to 0.15%. The desulfurisation 
of heavy fuel oil is assumed to be possible down to a level of 1 %. 
2. Desulfurisation of flue gases during or after combustion. This set of 
measures requires investments at the plant site. Three techniques are 
considered: desulfurisation during combustion with removal efficiencies 
of 50% at relatively low costs, flue gas desulfurisation with a removal 
efficiency of 95% at moderate costs, and the use of advanced flue gas 
purification with emission reduction of 98% at high costs. 
Not all abatement technologies are applicable for all fuel types and energy 
sectors. Moreover, a distinction is made between new and existing plants to 
account for the additional costs of retrofitting existing plants. 
For the optimization, RAINS creates "national cost functions" for con-
trolling emissions. National circumstances (such as sulfur content and operating 
hours) result in variations in the costs for applying the same technology in 
different countries in Europe. Another difference is the structural variation 
of energy systems, especially in the amount and structure of energy use, 
which determines the potential for application of individual control options. 
One way to combine these factors is to compile national cost functions. These 
functions display the lowest costs for achieving various emission levels by 
applying the cost optimal combination of abatement options. The cost curves 
used in this paper are based on official energy use projections for the year 2000 
as published by the International Energy Agency. 
Source-receptor transfer coefficients, which relate (country) emissions in 
the diffusion model to deposition at receptor points (for each grid), are based 
on the acid deposition model developed within the European Monitoring and 
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Evaluation Program (EMEP) (Iversen et al., 1991 ). The model calculates 
transboundary fluxes of oxidized sulfur and nitrogen as well as reduced 
nitrogen (ammonia and its product ammonium). For the trade simulations 
presented in this paper, EMEP model results have been applied that reflect 
the meteorological average of the years 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990. 
4. Results of the Trade Simulation 
4.1. SCENARIO SETTING 
Current negotiations on the new sulfur Protocol (Amann et al., 1992) focus 
on sulfur deposition targets. Provisional (interim) sulfur deposition targets were 
proposed by ten countries. Recent discussion centered on the original target 
loads (as of December 1991) being increased uniformly by 10, 20, 30 or 
40%. For the purpose of this study, the original targets loads submitted by 
ten countries, uniformly increased by 40%, have been selected as the reference 
targets (see Figure 6). 
This section examines the cost-effectiveness and environmental impacts 
of the following instruments (or scenarios) for achieving the target loads: 
1. a cost-minimum allocation of emission reduction measures (based on 
optimization); 
2. a uniform percentage reduction of emissions for all countries; 
3. emission trading with an offset rate of one; 
4. emission trading with an exchange rate equal to the marginal costs in 
the optimum; 
5. as 4, but restricting trade to neighboring countries. 
The allocation of reductions in Scenario 2 is steered by one "binding" 
receptor located in the United Kingdom. To meet the target load of this receptor, 
emissions have to be reduced by 84% compared to their 1980 levels. To 
create a "flat-rate" scenario, this 84% reduction was applied to all countries, 
where technically feasible. In those cases where such reductions were not 
considered achievable, the maximum technically feasible reductions were 
assumed. Since the extent of emission reduction is mainly steered by the 
"flat-rate" criterion, emission reductions in most countries are much higher 
than necessary to maintain target loads. Consequently, deposition is well below 
target loads at almost all receptor sites in Europe. 
The emission trading schemes (Scenarios 3, 4 and 5) simulate bilateral, 
sequential trading. The trading scheme with an offset rate of one allows the 
exchange of emission reduction commitments on a one-to-one basis. 
Consequently, emissions are constant, though depositions obviously change. 
The second scheme (Scenario 4) has a different ratio for each particular trade. 
The last scheme applies the same exchange rate as Scenario 4 but restricts 
trading to neighboring countries (F0rsund, l 992b). Neighbors are broadly 
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Figure 6. Target loads used in this paper (g S/m2/yr). 
defined and also include countries that are divided by a sea (for example Poland 
and Norway). 
In principle, emission trading can start from any initial distribution of 
emission reduction commitments. In this example, both emission trading 
schemes start from the 84% emission reduction target of Scenario 2. This 
has the advantage that initially the target loads are not violated and, there-
fore, it allows an analyis of whether or not emission trading results in violation 
of the targets. 
4.2. COST-EFFECTIVENESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF EMISSION 
TRADING SCENARIOS 
Table I displays the major results of the various scenarios in terms of their 
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Table I. Comparison of instruments 
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
Scenario: Cost Uniform Emission Emission Emission 
minimum % trading trading trading 
cutback one-to-one exchange neighbors 
rate only 
Annual costs 
(mio DM) 31200 63750 53267 44608 49639 
Annual costs 
(as % of uniform 
cutback) 49 100 84 70 78 
Emissions 
(kt S02) 26524 11760 11760 19727 16084 
Excess over target 
loads(% of 
ecosystems) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ecosystems protected 
(% of ecosystem) 77 90 90 87 88 
emission control costs, the total remaining emissions and the violation of 
target loads. The Table shows that Scenario 1 (optimized allocation) is the most 
cost-effective means to achieve the target loads. Costs of a uniform percent 
reduction (Scenario 2) are twice as high as in Scenario 1. Starting from 
Scenario 2, both emission trading schemes result in cost savings over the 
uniform reduction. However, trading on a one-to-one basis (Scenario 3) reduces 
costs by 16% (10 thousand millions DM/year), whereas trading using the 
exchange rates (based on the ratios of the marginal costs in the optimum, 
(Scenario 4) leads to cost savings of 30 percent over the uniform cut-back 
(Scenario 2) but does not attain the cost minimum (Scenario 1). Restricting 
trades to neighboring countries (Scenario 5) limits the costs savings to 22 
percent. At the same time, environmental impacts are different for each 
scenario. Target loads are not violated, per definition, in Scenarios 1 and 2, 
and by keeping the very low initial level of emissions constant, one-to-one 
trading also does not result in exceeding target loads (at least in this 
particular case). The cost savings of Scenario 4 and 5 (exchange-rate trading) 
are obtained by a substantial increase in emissions. Still, this increase does 
not result in the exceeding of target loads after trading due to the very low 
pre-trade level of emissions. 
Table I also shows that emissions remaining after the uniform cut-back 
(Scenario 2) are much lower than in Scenario I (cost minimum). Due to the 
flat rate requirement, emissions also have to be reduced in places where it is 
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not necessary to meet the deposition targets. Since Scenario 2 is taken as the 
starting point for trading, Scenario 3 (one-to-one trading) keeps the total 
European emissions constant at this level, but achieves cost savings by 
equalizing marginal costs for all emitters. Since the very low pre-trade 
emissions result in a strong overfulfillment of the target loads, the rearrange-
ment of reduction measures introduced by emission trading does not, in this 
case, violate target loads. 
The exchange-rate trading (Scenario 4) results in a considerable increase 
in emissions, from 11760 kt to 19727 kt. Consequently, costs are much lower 
than with the uniform cut-back. In spite of this increase in emissions, target 
loads are not violated. Again, this is due to the fact that initial (pre-trade) 
emissions are very low. Consequently, deposition at all but one of the recep-
tors is much lower than the target loads. Hence, if trading starts from this 
very low initial level, deposition at most receptors can be raised without 
exceeding the target loads. When exchange-rate trading is restricted to neigh-
bors (Scenario 5) the increase in emissions due to trading is more limited 
(increase to 16084 kton). This, and the fact that only neighbors trade, limits 
but does not eliminate the chance of exceeding target loads. 
The environmental impacts depend on the actual depositions of sulfur, and 
positive impacts exist even if the deposition is below the targets. One way 
to express this is to take a look at the average percentage of ecosystems in 
Europe that are exposed to levels of sulfur deposition below so-called critical 
loads, i.e., loads below which no damage is expected. The last row in Table 
I shows that, although the exceedance of target loads does not differ between 
the scenarios, the percentage of ecosystems protected does. Although one-
to-one trading (as in the USA) does not change the percentage of ecosystems 
protected compared to the uniform cutback (in both cases 90%) exchange-
rate trading would only result in 87% protection and the cost minimum only 
in 77% protection. Both exchange-rate trading as well as the cost minimum 
ignore benefits of reducing deposition below target loads. 
4.3. A CLOSER LOOK AT EXCHANGE-RATE TRADING 
Whereas in Scenario 3 a uniform exchange rate of one was selected, Scenario 
4 explores the scope for non-uniform rates . Since exchange or offset rates 
are instruments to determine the profitability and, thereby, the economic 
potential for individual trades, a selection of appropriate rates could steer 
the trading process into certain desired directions. 
To steer the trading process in this direction, one of the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions for the cost minimum (Eq. (6) in Section 2) is used to determine 
the exchange rate of emission trading between two countries . Thereby, the 
offset rate is set equal to the ratio of the marginal costs of emission reduc-
tions in the optimum: v = c~/c~. 
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For example, marginal costs for country 1 of 2000 DM/t S02 and for country 
2 of 1000 DM/t S02 result in an exchange rate of 2: 
_s_ - 2000 - _l - 2 
c~ - 1000 - 1 -
This implies that if source 1 increases emissions with one unit, source 2 can 
reduce its emissions with 2 units. Since marginal costs in the optimum gen-
erally differ among countries, exchange rates for the bilateral trades will also 
be different for each trade combination. 
Table II shows the trades that are expected to be implemented for this 
scenario. The exchange rate differs among the implemented trades between 
0.03 (Trade 6) and 11.12 (Trade 21). The first trade is expected to take place 
between Turkey and France. Due to Turkey's rapid economic development, 
the marginal costs of the pre-trade initial status (an 84% emission reduction 
compared to 1980) are extremely high. The optimal solution, however, pre-
scribes no emission reductions for Turkey since its emissions do not deposit 
on areas for which target loads are binding. Consequently, the marginal costs 
of the optimal solution are zero. The resulting exchange rate with France of 
0.08 (French marginal costs of the optimum are only 8% of the marginal 
costs in Turkey) allows Turkey to increase its emissions by 1912 kt up to 
the unabated level (i.e., 3254 kt of S02), whereas France would reduce its 
emissions by 1912 x 0.075 = 144 kt. This saves Turkey abatement costs of 
5.0 thousand millions DM/yr, while costs in France increase by 622 million 
DM/yr. The· net cost savings of this trade are 4.4 thousand millions DM/year. 
After implementation of the first trade, pre-trade emissions change and 
the potential cost savings of all remaining bilateral trades with either France 
or Turkey involved are calculated again. The trade with the highest cost saving 
is implemented. This procedure is repeated until no trade with cost savings 
above a certain threshold (in the example, 0.1 million DM/year) is left. Table 
II shows that 35 trades would be implemented under the exchange rate regime. 
The total cost savings per year would amount to 19.0 thousand millions 
DM/year. The gains from the first ten trades add up to nearly 90% of the 
total cost savings. As can be observed, a number of countries (e.g., Turkey, 
France, remaining part of the former USSR, Poland, Kola Peninsula) would 
trade with several partners. 
If the exchange-rate trading would be restricted to neighboring countries, 
cost savings would be somewhat smaller. The trading pattern would also be 
different from Table II. The most profitable trade now would be struck between 
Turkey and Ukraine, saving nearly 2 thousand millions DM per year. France 
now trades with Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Luxembourg, 
reducing its emissions, therefore allowing these countries to increase emis-
sions. France is a country with high marginal costs in the optimal solution 
and one of the twelve binding target loads is located in France. 
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Table I indicates the extent to which exchange-rate trading is able to 
approach the cost-minimum solution. With exchange-rate trading costs are 
44608 million OM/year, whereas the optimal cost level is only 31200 million 
OM/year. After trading, 22 countries (out of 33) have marginal costs that are 
equal to the marginal costs in the optimum. This implies that trades between 
these 22 countries would not result in cost savings, since their marginal cost 
ratios equal the exchange rates. For all other countries, marginal costs in the 
pre-trade situation exceed the marginal costs of the optimum. This indicates 
that if one trade between these countries were to take place, one country would 
move towards the optimum but the other would move further away. The results 
further suggest that of the other trades still possible, the cost savings are smaller 
than the threshold of 0.1 million OM/year. Although 22 countries have marginal 
costs equal to the optimum marginal costs, only six countries (Belgium, 
Hungary, Luxembourg, Rumania, Ukraine and Moldavia) actually reach the 
same emission levels. That is, the first mentioned of these 22 countries end 
up in a different part of the same segment of the cost curve. One example is 
France, where the optimum (402 kt S02) is at the upper end, and the pre-
trade emission (253 kt S02) is at the lower end of the same segment (of 9506 
OM/ton S02) of the cost curve. This affirms that the result of exchange-rate 
trading depends on the pre-trade emission levels. 
Table I also shows that emissions will increase after trading from 11760 
to 19727 kt. The emissions are still lower than necessary (26654 kt S02) to 
meet the cost minimum. As a result, pollution control costs, although below 
the initial level of 63.7 thousand millions OM/year, are (with 44.6 thousand 
millions OM/year) still above the cost minimum. 
Several factors are responsible for the non-attainment of the optimal 
solution. First, the exchange rate is based only on one condition for the 
optimum solution. It ignores the fact that deposition has to be below the 
standard, and hence the mathematical formulations of both cost minimiza-
tion and exchange-rate trading are not identical. Second, the concept of 
marginal costs is ambiguous for piecewise linear cost curves. In the optimum 
solution, the stepwise cost function sometimes allows for two optimal marginal 
costs due to the piecewise linear cost functions (compare Figure 4). The 
exchange rate, however, is only based on one of them. Finally, the post-trade 
situation is not independent of the initial pre-trade emission level, since the 
exchange rate applies to all (intramarginal) trades, and thus does not rule out 
that exchange-rate trading ends at an interior solution. 
4.4. THE SENSITIVITY OF THE TRADE SIMULATIONS 
The results discussed above depend on the specific situation assumed for these 
scenarios and may be sensitive to changes in: pre-trade emission levels, trans-
action costs, availability of information to the traders (perfect or imperfect) 
w 
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Table II. Trades implemented with exchange-rate trading 
Trade Buyer of Amount Remain. Seller of Amount Remain. Exchange Cost Saving 
emission (kt S02) emission permits (kt S02) emission rate (mio DM/yr) 
permits (kt SOJ (kt S02) 
l Turkey 1912 3254 France -144 414 0.08 4386 
2 Rem CIS 2827 3978 FRG-E -414 384 0.15 2437 
3 Bulgaria 1303 1540 France -93 321 0.07 1579 
4 Poland 166 750 Baltic --64 138 0.38 1499 
5 Spain 2568 3065 France -67 254 0.03 1401 
6 Yugoslavia 709 1030 FRG-W -124 379 0.17 1306 
7 Rumania 1087 1401 Yugoslavia -560 468 0.52 1285 
8 Kola 350 461 Rumania -856 544 2.45 951 
9 CSFR 58 766 Kola-Karelia -81 380 l.40 829 
10 Sweden 210 304 Turkey -362 2891 l.73 778 
11 Greece 249 338 Spain -792 2272 3.18 641 
12 Hungary 30 610 Kola-Karelia -61 319 2.06 365 
13 Austria 45 108 Italy -48 566 1.07 318 
14 Portugal 274 316 Bulgaria -350 1188 l.28 280 
15 Norway 79 112 United Kingdom -43 730 0.55 245 
c;) 
16 Ireland 107 157 Denmark -34 37 0.32 213 
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17 Petersburg 86 182 Poland -34 716 0.40 158 ;i.. 
18 Albania 103 145 Ukraine -75 996 0.73 142 ~ 
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Table II. (Continued) 
Trade Buyer of Amount Remain. Seller of 
emission (kt S02) emission permits 
permits (kt S02) 
19 Finland 132 223 Turkey 
20 Switzerland 2 45 Byelorussia 
21 Luxembourg 5 7 Rumania 
22 Rem. CIS 227 4205 Greece 
23 Belgium 6 137 Bulgaria 
24 Rem. CIS 186 4391 Turkey 
25 Rem. CIS 147 4538 Portugal 
26 Rem. CIS 111 4649 Albania 
27 Rem. CIS 29 4678 Switzerland 
28 Rem. CIS 22 4700 Hungary 
29 Rem. CIS 32 4733 Netherlands 
30 Rem. CIS 21 4754 Luxembourg 
31 Rem. CIS 15 4769 Norway 
32 Rem. CIS 67 4836 Ireland 
33 Rem. CIS 146 4981 Austria 
34 Rem. CIS 7 4988 Bulgaria 
35 Rem. CIS 3 4991 Moldavia 
Amount Remain. 
(kt S02) emission 
(kt S02) 
-520 2370 
-23 146 
-50 493 
-140 197 
-26 1162 
-128 2242 
-84 233 
-76 69 
-2 44 
-3 607 
-5 68 
-I 5 
-9 103 
-38 120 
-29 79 
-5 1157 
-2 77 
Exchange 
rate 
3.96 
9.84 
11.12 
0.62 
4.74 
0.69 
0.57 
0.68 
0.06 
0.12 
0.16 
0.05 
0.57 
0.57 
0.20 
0.73 
0.62 
Cost Saving 
(mio DM/yr) 
118 
63 
35 
25 
18 
18 
12 
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on the potential cost savings of each trade, information on cost functions 
available to the environmental agency determining the exchange rate or offset-
rates, and assumptions made on the behavior of the trading partners. 
Table III explores the sensitivities introduced by changes in pre-trade 
emissions and transaction costs by analyzing a different starting point (starting 
from the optimum solution instead of the uniform 84% reduction), and by 
including transaction costs on the performance of emission trading with an 
exchange rate. Column (b) repeats the results of the cost-minimum solution 
and column (c) gives the results for exchange-rate trading if this trading 
starts from the uniform cutback. It can be seen that if exchange-rate trading 
started from the optimum (column d) it would stay close to the optimum 
(column b). Two trades take place that only marginally change emissions. 
The first trade allows Turkey to reduce emissions and the Baltic region to 
increase. These trades are caused by the definition problem of marginal costs 
in the optimum mentioned before. The traded amounts, however, are limited. 
As a result, cost savings are very small and the target loads are not exceeded. 
Table III . Sensitivity of exchange-rate trading 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
Scenario: Cost Emission Pre-trade Transaction costs 
minimum trading emissions (50 mio DM/ 
exchange rate of optimum trade per year) 
Annual costs 
(Mio DM) 31200 44608 31195 44750 
Annual costs 
(as % of cost 
minimum) 100 143 100 143 
Emissions 
(kt S02) 26524 19727 26537 19343 
The second example analyzes the potential influence of non-zero transac-
tion costs (costs of finding a trading partner, agreeing upon a trade, getting 
a trade accepted) (column e). An assumed level of 50 million OM/year per 
trade (column e) would reduce the number of profitable trades to 19 (instead 
of 35) (as in column c), starting from a uniform 84% cutback. The pollution 
control costs would not differ significantly from the reference scenario (column 
c), but the distribution of emissions would change considerably (a number 
of trades would not take place). Still, the target loads are not violated. Again 
this is due to the fact that initial emissions are very low, over-satisfying 
targets at most receptors. It can be concluded that in this case the impact of 
transaction costs on cost savings is negligible. 
Although exchange-rate trading does not result in the exceeding of target 
loads, at least not in the examples shown, simple one-to-one trading does, if 
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one starts from the optimum emission level. Although overall European 
emissions are kept at the same level as before, their geographical distribu-
tion differs, resulting now in exceeding target loads for 2% to 95% of the 
ecosystems in the ten countries that submitted target loads. 
Three other assumptions deserve discussion. First, the algorithm assumes 
perfect information: trades are ;mplemented in descending order of their cost-
savings. Assuming imperfect information (random trading) might result in 
considerably lower cost savings than in the first case (see Atkinson and 
Tietenberg, 1991). This requires further analysis. Second, to set the exchange 
rate it is assumed that the environmental agency has perfect information 
about abatement costs when determining the optimal solution. It appears 
more realistic, however, to assume that this information is less than perfect, 
mainly because cost functions depend crucially on the underlying prediction 
of future energy consumption. Consequently, if the agency sets exchange 
rates on centrally perceived cost curves it might well be that countries trade 
on the basis of what they individually see as realistic cost functions . The results 
of emission trading will therefore differ from the expectations of the agency. 
As a result, the emission pattern (determining environmental impacts) will also 
be uncertain. Third, given initial emission and exchange rates, it is assumed 
that trading partners will try to minimize costs. Although this is a realistic 
assumption for firms operating on a competitive market, it is doubtful whether 
this is an adequate assumption for the behavior of countries in an interna-
tional context (Kremeniouk, 1991 ). Countries might well place more emphasis 
on their environmental targets than on cost-effectiveness. Moreover, aspects 
of administrative practicality as well as political considerations are likely to 
play an important role (compare Opschoor and Vos, 1989). 
5. Conclusions and Discussion 
Emission trading offers an alternative approach for achieving cost-effective 
implementation of effect-oriented policy targets. The situation is complex when 
considering non-uniformly dispersed pollutants, where the location of the 
emission source is important. In theory, trading deposition (or ambient) permits 
or pollution-offset trading would fulfill the conditions for cost-minimal resource 
allocation. However, it is very difficult to design trade regimes that will lead 
the players to approach the optimal solution by themselves. This points to 
the need for a simpler design. One relatively simple system is to have national 
emission quotas, initially, and allow countries to trade according to a fixed 
exchange rate. From a number of formal conditions for the cost-minimum 
solution, the ratios of the marginal costs of abatement in the optimal solution 
are introduced into a new trading scheme as exchange rates for emission 
trading. Thereby, the transfer coefficients of those receptors that are binding 
in the optimum are taken into account. It is shown that, generally, because 
other necessary conditions for an optimum solution are neglected, this system 
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will not achieve the optimal solution. In addition, such a trading system does 
not guarantee that environmental deposition constraints are not violated. But 
purification costs are reduced. 
Based on the IIASA RAINS model, a routine has been developed to simulate 
bilateral, sequential emission trading for the specific situation of reducing 
S02 emissions in Europe. 
For a set of example target loads for the deposition, calculations identi-
fied the cost-minimal allocations of emission reductions and the required 
uniform reduction strategy to satisfy the selected target loads. Taking an 84% 
uniform reduction strategy as a starting point, emission trading simulations 
achieved cost savings. A one-to-one offset rate (keeping total European emis-
sions constant) limits the potential cost savings to 16%; deposition targets 
are not violated, since initial emissions allocation overfulfilled targets at 
many places. If an exchange rate, based on marginal costs, is applied to trading, 
total emissions increase considerably, thereby achieving more significant cost 
savings (30%). Allowing only neighbors to trade limits cost savings and 
reduces the chance that deposition targets are violated but might be more 
politically acceptable. Again, due to the low level of pre-trade emissions, 
the specified target loads are not exceeded with both exchange-rate trading 
schemes. 
The results of emission trading are sensitive to a number of assumptions, 
such as the pre-trade emission levels, the transaction costs, the availability 
of information on potential cost savings and assumptions made on the behavior 
of trading partners. Despite this sensitivity, the trading schemes explored in 
this paper offer possibilities for significant costs savings. 
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Notes 
1 Restrictions on lower and upper limits on emissions could be introduced for increased realism, 
as in F91rsund (1992a), but we simplify here since assuming an interior solution for emission 
levels does not play any role for the trade problem dealt with . 
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